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Abstract
In this paper we propose a simplicial algorithm to find a core
element for balanced games without side payments. The algorithm subdivides
an appropriate simplex into smaller simplices and generates from an arbit-
rarily chosen point a sequence of adjacent simplices of variable dimension.
Within a finite number of iterations the algoríthm finds a simplex yielding
an approximating core element. If the accuracy of approximation is not
satisfactory the algorithm can be restarted with a smaller mesh size in
order to improve the accuracy.
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1. Introduction
It is well-known that a cooperative game need not to have an outcome
which cannot be improved upon by any subaet of pleyers. In case of a game
with side payment the core, consiating of all outcomes which cannot be im-
proved, is nonempty if and only if the geme is balanced, see Bondareva [4]
and Shapley [8]. A core element in a balanced game with side payments can be
easily calculated by solving a sequence of linear programming problems.
Games without side payments were introduced by Aumann and Peleg [2],
and Aumann [1] developed the core concept for such gemes. Scarf C7] proved
the nonemptiness of the core for such a game íf it is balanced. Scarf gave a
constructive proof based on the complementary pivoting technique introduced
by Lemke and Howson [6]. Shapley [9] generalized the well-known Knaster-
Kuratowski-Mazurkiwicz Theorem on the unit simplex in order to give a con-
structive proof of the nonemptiness of the core. In an arbitrary subdivision
of the (unit) simplex into simplicea, a aequence of adjacent simplices is
generated, which is initiated at one of the corners of the big simplex. The
terminal simplex yields an approximating core element.
In this paper we propose a simplicisl algorithm which can be
initiated at any point of the unit simplex. From that point the algorithm
generates a sequence of adjacent simplices of varying dlmension. The algo-
rithm leaves the starting point along one out of 2n - 2 directions in case
there are n players. This number corresponds to the number of proper coali-
tions in the game. The algorithm is based on the simplicial algorithm
developed by Doup, van der Lasn and Talman [5] for computing economic equi-
libria. Along the path of aimplices generated by the algorithm, coalitiona
are added and sometimes deleted until a balanced set of coslitions has been
found. Once such a set is obtained, an approximating core element hes been
found. If the accuracy of approximation at that point ia not satisfactory,
the algorithm can be restarted at that point with a smaller mesh size of the
triangulatíon in order to improve the accuracy. Within a finite number of
restarts any accuracy of approximation can be reached.2
2. Balanced game and core
Let N denote the set {1,...,n} and 2N the set of all nonempty sub-
sets of N. We call the elements of N end the elements of 2N, plsyers and
coalitions, respectively. A game is a pair (N,v) where v is a mapping from
2N to the set of subsets of the n-dimensional euclidean space, RN. The set
v(S) represents the set of payoff or utility vectors that the players of
coalition S can ensure by themselves, regardless of the actions of players
outside the coalition. For S in 2N, let RS denote the ~S~-dimensional sub-
space of RN with coordinates indexed by the elements of S. If x E RN and S E
2N, then xS E RS will denote the projection of x on RS.
Assumption 2.1: For each S E 2N, the set v(S) satisfies
i) if x E v(S) and xi - yi for ell i E S, then y E v(S),
ii) if x E v(S) and y( x, then y E v(S),
iii) v(S) is closed, -
iv) {xSlx E v(S)} is nonempty and bounded from above.
Without loss of generality we assume that each set v({i}), i E N,
has been normalized to the half apace {x~xi ~ 0} and that the other v(S)'s
have been shifted accordingly. The core of a game representa the set of
feasible utility vectors that cannot be improved upon by any coalition.
Definition 2.1: The core of the game (N,v) is the set
C(N,v) -{x E v(N)~~ S E 2N end y E v(S) such that yi ) xi for all 1 E S}.
Under Assumption 2.1, the core is a closed and bounded set but may,
however, be empty. It is a well known fact that every balanced game has a
nonempty core.
Let B be a collection of nonempty subsets of 2N, and let B1 -
{S E B~i E S}, The set B is said to be balanced if there exist nonnegative
numbers bS, S E B, such that
ïS~ bS z 1 for all i E N.
1
A game (N,v) is said to be balanced if for every balanced set B3
nS~v(S) C v(N).
Theorem 2.1 (Scarf [7]): Every balanced game has a nonempty core.
Let U be the (n-1)-dimensional aubset of RN defined by U- conv{-
Mne(j)~j - 1,...,n} where e(j) is the j-th unit vector in RN and the number
M) 0 is such that x E v(S) implies xi C M for every 1 E S. Let e be the n-
vector of ones. The function T: U~ RF is defined by
T(u) - max{r E R~u t re E uS~ v(S)}.
Clearly, t is a continuous function on U, for example see Berge [3]. For S E
2N we now define the set CS by
CS -{u E U~u i T(u)e E v(S)}.
Since v(S) is closed, the set CS is also cloaed. The algorithm will compute
e point uM in U such that for some balanced collection Bw
u~ E nSEBM CS.
Then XN - uM . t(u~)e E nS~„ v(S) C v(N) and x~ lies in the core since x~
lies on the (upper) boundary of uS~ v(S).
Lemma 2.2 (Shapley (9]): For all u E U, if u E CS then S C{1 E N~ui ~ 0}.
Proof: Let u E CS and T -{i E N~ui ~ 0}. The lemma is trivial if T- N. So
assume that ~T~ ( n. Because ui - 0 for ell i(C T, we have LiETui --Mn, so
there exists a k E T for which uk C-M. Since u. 2(u)e E RA, we have uk t
t(u) ~ 0, and hence T(u) ) M. On the other hand, u. t(u)e E v(S), so for
every j E S, uj t t(u) C M. Therefore uj C 0 for every j E S, from which it
follows that S C T. Q.E.D.
The lemma will guarantee the algorithm never hits the boundary of
the set U.4
3. The algorithm
To describe the algorithm, let p be an arbitrarily chosen starting
point in the relative interior of U. Next, let s be a sign vector in RN,
i.e., s~ E{0,-1,.1} for all j E N. We call a sign vector s feasible if s
contains at least one -1 and one .1. For a feasible sign vector s let the
subset A(s) of U be defined by
A(s) -{u E U~u~IP~ ' maxh
uhlph if s3 - -1
u~IP3 - minh uhlph if s3 - 41}.
Clearly, the dimension of A(s) is equal to t- ~I~(s)~ . 1 where
I~(s) - {i E N~si - 0}.
In particular, if the sign vector s does not contain zeros then A(s) is a 1-
dimensional set, being the line segment connecting p and the point p(s) in
the boundary of U given by p~(s) - 0 for all j with s~ - tl and p~(s) --
~pjlLs --1 Ph
for all j with s~ --1. For n - 2 the subdivision of U into
h
sets A(s) for an arbitrary p is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Next U is sub-
divided into n-dimensional simplices such that each A(s) is triangulated
into t-dimensional simplices, for example see Doup, van der Lean and Talman
C5]. A t-dimensional simplex or t-simplex a can be represented by its ttl
vertices wl, ,wt}1 To each vertex w of the simplicial subdivision we
assign a vector label s(S) corresponding to some fixed coalition S for which
w lies in CS, where s3(S) - 1- ~S~In for j E S end a3(S) --~S~In for j iC
S. For g - t or t-1, let 6(wl, , .,wgal) be a g-simplex with vertices
wl, ..,wg}1 in A(s) for some feasible aign vector s. Let a(Sf) be the vector
label of vertex w~, then we cell v s-complete i f the system of linear equa-
tions
tl a S~)l (e(h)1 r0
l (3.1) Eg-1 aj (1 J




has a nonnegative solution ~~, j- 1,...,g.l, ~ for h a IC(s). In particu-
lar, for t- 1 and g- 0, the zero-dimensional simplex consisting of the
point p is s~-complete with s~ ~ tl if i E S~ and s~ --1 if i iC S~, where
S~ is such that a(S~) is the vector label of p. If S~ equals N, the point p
t t(p)e lies in the core. Suppose now that S~ unequals N. Clearly, s~ is
feasible and does not contain zeros. Notice that there are 2n-2 feasible
sign vectors not containing zeroa end that each such sign vector corresponds
in this way to one of the 2n-2 proper coalitions.
The starting point p of the algorithm is an end point of a uniquely
determined 1-dimensional símplex v(p,pl) in A(s~) end therefore v(p,pl) is
also s~-complete. Let a(S1) be the vector label of pl then the algorithm is6
initiated by making a linear programming pivot step with (a(S1)T,1)T in the
system
a(a(lo), - Lh-1 y~shle~h)J
~ r~l. (3.2)
If by this pivot step ~ becomes first 0, the algorithm movea to the 1-sim-
plex a(pl,p2) in A(s~) adjacent to C(p,pl) and continues with making a pivot
step with (a(52)T,1)T, where a(S2) is the vector label of p2. Otherwise, one
of the uh's must become first 0.
In general the algorithm generates, for varying feasible aign vec-
tors s, a sequence of adjacent t-dimensional simplices in A(s), having s-
complete common facets. In each simplex a(w1, ..,wt;l) a pivot step is made
in (3.1) in order to determine which variable becomes first 0. To prevent
degeneracy we perturb the right hand side of (3.1). If for some
j E{1,...,t~l}, aj becomes 0, then the facet 2 opposite vertex wj of v is
also s-complete. If this facet does not lie in the boundary of A(s), there
is exactly one t-simplex á in A(s) having T also as a facet. Let w be the
vertex of á opposite to T, then the algorithm continues by making a pivot
step in (3.1) with (a(3)T, 1)T, where a(3) is the vector label of w. If t
lies in the boundary of A(s) then either T is a(t-1)-simplex in A(s) with
IIU(s)I - IIC(s)I - 1 or t lies in the boundary of U.
Lemma 3.1: An s-complete facet in A(s) does not lie in the boundary of U.
Proof: Suppose that T is an s-complete ( t-1)-simplex in A(s), lying in
bd(U). Clearly, xi - 0 for all x E T and all i for which si - rl. Let
yl, ,yt be the vertices of T. Therefore yi - 0 for all i for which si -
tl. Let a(Sj) be the vector label of vertex yj, j- 1,...,t. According to
Lemma 2.2, we must have i(~ Sj, j- 1,...,t, for all i for which si -.1. On
the other hand, T is s-complete. Therefore
t a(S~)l (e(h)1 r0l Fj-1 aj 1 J
- ïsh~0 Nhshl 0 J
- I1J (3.3)has a nonnegative solution a~, j- 1,...,t, yth for h(C IC(s). For all i with
si -{1, since i Q Sj, we have that ai(Sj) --ISjl~n, j- 1,...,t. Con-
sequently, for i with si -.1, the i-th equation at the solution of (3.3) is
equal to
-it a~ISjl~n - u~ - 0 j-1 j i
and hence Ki ~ 0, which contradicts Hi ~ 0. Q.E.D.
An s-complete facet of a t-simplex in A(s) in the boundary of A(s)
therefore must be a(t-1)-simplex in A(à) with àj ~ 0 for some j E IC(s) and
sh - sh for all h~ j. Then the algorithm continues with making a pivot step
with àj(e(j)T, 0)T.
Finally, by making a pivot step in ( 3.1) for a t-simplex a in
one of the ~'s may become first 0. Becauae of the perturbation of the
hand side we may asaume that only one of the Jth's, say uk, becomes 0.
is not the
just one
only positive or negative component of a, then T
(t.l)-simplex á in A(à) where àk - 0 and àh - sh
be the vertex of á opposite to a and let e(S) be the vector
the algorithm continues by making a pívot step with (a(S)T,
that sk is the only positive or negative component of
implies that when we disregard the perturbation also
zero and hence that the system
Fttl A ra(Sj)1 - r01




is a facet of
for h~ k. Let w
label of w, then
T 1) . Suppose now
s, then system (3.1)
the other ~'s must be
has a nonnegative solution a~, j z 1,...,t.l. For j- 1,...,t41, let b` be
defined by
then we get
S~ - ~~~(Fi41 ~ilsil~n).
il~j b~ - 1 for i- 1,...,n.8
Hence, the subset BM -{S1, ..,St;l} is balanced. We remark that some of the
~~'s and therefore some of the b~'s might be equsl to zero. In that case we
restrict ourselves to the balanced subset of coalitions S~ for which A~ ) 0.
The point u' z ï~~i ~~w~ can be considered to approximately lie in
nSEB~CS
in the sense that u~ lies close to e point in CS for any S E B`. Hence, the
point uM f 2(u~)e can be taken as an approximating core element.
For u E U, let 2N(u) be defined by
ZN(u) - max{r E R~u t re E v(N)}.
As a measure of accuracy of approximation at u~ one could consider the non-
negative number t(u~) - TN(u~). If the latter number is too large one may
restart the algorithm with a simpliciel subdivision of U having a smaller
mesh size and with p equal to u~. Now, let (G1, G2, ..) be a sequence of
k~ k~ triangulations of U wíth mesh size tending to zero and let u . T(u )e be
the approximating core element found with the algorithm applied for the
M
triangulation , k- 1,2,... . Let Bk be the set of balanced coalitions
M corresponding to the verticea of the final simplex containing uk , for
kM
sll k. Then there existk-e subsequence kl, k2,.. , such that B~- BM for
some balanced set B~ and u~ converges to some ui in U. Since the vertices
of vk on this subsequence also converge to u~ and each CS is closed, we
obtain that uM E nS~~CS and hence that uN 4 t(uN)e lies in the core, due to
the balancedness of B~. Notice that 2(u~) - tN(u') must be zero.
Because the number of simplices of any triangulation Gk in the
sequence is finite and due to the perturbation to avoid degeneracy, the
algorithm finds for each k within a finite number of iterations an approxi-
mating core element. Moreover, within a finite number of restarts, any accu-
racy of approximation will be reached.9
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